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income tax reforms 
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Abstract: This paper utilizes a simple general-equilibrium model to analyse the long-run effects 
of Bulgaria’s 2007-08 corporate-personal income tax reforms. In particular, we consider the 
effect working through the firm’s capital structure, and argue that the new reforms incentivize 
firms to increase investment, as the new regime benefits retained earnings. The increase in 
capital increases output and productivity, which in turn increases consumption and welfare. On 
average, households are enjoying 8.65% higher consumption in the new steady-state in the 
benchmark scenario. As a robustness check, we allow for a variable labor supply, where the 
gain increases further by additional 3.9% of consumption, to produce an overall gain of 
13.55%.  
Keywords: general equilibrium tax reform, firm’s capital structure, welfare gain 
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1. Introduction 
We set up a general-equilibrium model with a detailed corporate finance sector in order to 
provide a quantitative assessment of the 2007-08 corporate-personal income tax reforms in 
Bulgaria. Starting from a rate of 32.5% in 2000, the corporate tax rate was decreased in several 
steps down to its current rate of 10% in 2007. Similarly, the progressive income tax schedule 
was flattened until a uniform rate of 10% was introduced in 2008, which is in place today as 
well. In addition, a dividend tax of 5% was introduced. The particular focus of the paper falls 
on the effect of tax changes for the cost of finance, and how that changes the firm’s financial 
structure. Under the new regime, the firms realize certain benefits from retained earnings, 
which is an incentive to increase investment and accumulate physical capital. That in turn leads 
to expansion of output and profit. Since after tax profit is distributed to firm owners 
(households), consumption increases as well. 
The novelty relative to Vasilev (2019) is that in this model households face an explicit utility-
maximization problem, which is a function of their consumption path. This allows us to 
measure the welfare gain of the introduction of the two tax reforms in Bulgaria in terms of 
additional consumption enjoyed. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
outlines the model. Section 3 describes the calibration procedure and presents the results from 
the computational experiments performed in this paper. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
For the most part, the model follows closely Funke and Strulik (2006), which in turn is a 
general-equilibrium extension of Funke’s (2002) partial-equilibrium representation. In 
particular, we start with a representative firm, which uses physical capital, K, and labor, L, 
and combines them using a Cobb-Douglas production function to maximize intertemporal 
profit 
𝜋𝜋 = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾,          (1) 
where A denotes total factor productivity, and 𝛿𝛿 is the economic depreciation rate. Note that in 
this paper we distinguish between economic depreciation and accounting depreciation, i.e. 
depreciation for tax purposes. In particular, following Sinn (1987), we divide tax depreciation 
into a part of gross investment (I) that is written off immediately (z), while the remainder (1-z) 
depreciates at the economic rate 𝛿𝛿.  Therefore, total depreciation for tax purposes equals 
𝑧𝑧(𝐼𝐼 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾) + (1 − 𝑧𝑧)𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 = 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼 + 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾. Next, before-tax dividends are defined as follows: 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝜋𝜋 − 𝐼𝐼 − 𝑇𝑇,           
 (2) 
where 
𝑇𝑇 = 𝜏𝜏(𝜋𝜋 − 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼 − 𝐷𝐷)          (3) 
are the corporate taxes on the firm’s retained earnings. Eqs. (1)-(3) then imply that dividends 
are then 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾 − (1−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏)𝐼𝐼
1−𝜏𝜏
. 
Next, we introduce a “tax discrimination” variable 𝜃𝜃 to capture the opportunity cost of 
retained earnings in terms of the net dividend foregone, e.g. King (1977), where 
𝜃𝜃 = 1−𝑚𝑚
1−𝜏𝜏
,            (4) 
and m is the personal tax rate on dividends. Note that for 𝜃𝜃 < 1, there is a preferential tax 
treatment of retained earnings, which will affect the financial structure of the firm and the 
choice of investment in particular. 
The firm is assumed to maximize the discounted stream of after-tax dividends 




0 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,        (6) 
where the real interest rate r is taken as given by the firm. In addition, the maximization 
problem is subject to the following capital accumulation constraint: 
?̇?𝐾 = 𝐼𝐼.            (7) 
Setting up a Hamiltonian, we can derive the optimality condition for the capital user cost: 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴[𝐾𝐾
𝐿𝐿
]𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝛿𝛿 = 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑧𝑧)𝑟𝑟.         (8) 
In other words, the net return on equity and bonds needs to be the same in order to prevent 
arbitrage opportunities. 
Next, on the consumer side we have a representative on-member forward-looking household, 
which is infinitely-lived and maximized the sum of discounted utility streams, represented by 





−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,          (9) 
where C denotes consumption, 𝜌𝜌 is the time preference parameter (assumed to be constant), 
and 1/𝜎𝜎 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. 
The household financial wealth (W) consists of equity (V) and bond (B) holdings. The law of 
motion for bonds is 
?̇?𝐵 = (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝑤𝑤 + (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 + 𝜃𝜃𝐷𝐷 + 𝑍𝑍 − (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)𝐶𝐶,    (10) 
where Z is the lump-sum transfers from the government, and 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 is the consumption tax rate. 
Together with ?̇?𝑉, the law of motion for wealth becomes 
?̇?𝑊 = (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝑤𝑤 + (1 −𝑚𝑚)𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 + 𝑍𝑍 − (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐)𝐶𝐶.     (11) 
The first-order condition emerging from the household’s constrained optimization problem is 





.          (12) 
Next, the government finances its expenditure G via taxes and issue of bonds (𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺), and its 
budget constraint is 
𝐺𝐺 + 𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = 𝐵𝐵?̇?𝐺 + 𝑚𝑚 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺 + 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 + 𝐷𝐷
(1−𝜏𝜏)
� + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 + 𝜏𝜏(𝜋𝜋 − 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼 − 𝐷𝐷)  (13) 
Note that government debt is “Ricardian,” which means that instead of debt we can have 
government transfers balancing the government budget constraint, or 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝑚𝑚 �𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 + 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺 + 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 + 𝐷𝐷
(1−𝜏𝜏)
� + 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 + 𝜏𝜏(𝜋𝜋 − 𝑧𝑧𝐼𝐼 − 𝐷𝐷) − 𝐺𝐺   (14) 
In other words, the path of government debt can be represented as a time series of 
government transfers. Additionally, we also assume that G/Y=g=const, and L=1.  
National accounts then imply that  
𝐼𝐼 = (1 − 𝑔𝑔)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝛿𝛿𝐾𝐾.        (15) 
Substituting this expression back into the law of motion for capital (7), and after some 
algebra, we can obtain 
?̇?𝐾
𝑘𝑘
= (1 − 𝑔𝑔)𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝐶𝐶
𝐾𝐾
− 𝛿𝛿,                                                                                       (16) 
where we have defined 𝑐𝑐 = 𝐶𝐶/𝐾𝐾 and 𝑘𝑘 = 𝐾𝐾/𝐿𝐿. We can further rewrite the equation above as 
?̇?𝑘
𝑘𝑘
= (1 − 𝑔𝑔)𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼−1 − 𝑐𝑐 − 𝛿𝛿 − 1.       (17) 






− 1 − ?̇?𝑘
𝑘𝑘
,        (18) 
where 𝜙𝜙 = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑧𝑧). The two non-linear ordinary differential equations above 
comprise the dynamic system of the model economy, together with an initial condition for 
capital, as well as a boundary (transversality) condition for capital preventing non-stationary 
solution paths. Next, in steady-state, 
𝑘𝑘∗ = [𝜎𝜎+𝜌𝜌+𝜙𝜙𝛿𝛿
𝛼𝛼𝜙𝜙
]1/(𝛼𝛼−1)         (19) 
𝑐𝑐∗ = (1 − 𝑔𝑔)(𝑘𝑘∗)𝛼𝛼−1 − 1 − 𝛿𝛿       (20) 
It is easy to show that  𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
𝜕𝜕𝜏𝜏
< 0 , and also that 𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘
∗
𝜕𝜕𝜙𝜙
< 0. In other words, a reduction in the 
corporate tax rate increases investment and steady-state capital stock. Steady-state 
consumption will then also increases, as consumption is a monotone function of capital. 
Using the notation we introduced earlier, and holding total factor productivity level constant 
(A=1), the utility function can be expressed as follows: 








0 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,     (21) 
and the equilibrium interest rate is given by 𝑟𝑟∗ = 𝜎𝜎 + 𝜌𝜌 . Next, as in Lucas (2003) we will 
compute the compensatory variation as the welfare gain measured in percentage of additional 
consumption relative to the consumption under the old tax policy. But before we can provide 
a quantitative assessment of the tax reforms, we need first to assign values to all parameters in 
the model. We do this in the next section. 
 
3. Model parameterization and calibration 
We follow the tradition in modern quantitative macroeconomics, e.g. Vasilev (2105c, 2016b, 
2017e) and calibrate the model in order to perform a quantitative analysis of the tax reforms 
through the use of a computational experiment. First, as in Vasilev (2015a), the capital share 
is set to its average rate in data, or 𝛼𝛼 = 0.429. Next the discount rate was set to 𝜚𝜚 = 0.02 as in 
Vasilev (2019).  Due to the lack of data, we set 𝜎𝜎 = 1.01, as in Vasilev (2015b), which results 
into an approximately logarithmic specification for utility. 
As in Vasilev (2017a), the capital-output ratio was set to K/Y= 3.5. Depreciation rate was 
estimated in Vasilev (2016) to be 𝛿𝛿 = 0.05. Thus produces an investment-to-output ratio of 
0.18% which is very close to that in data. Next, as in Vasilev (2017b) the value of g was set to 
the average government consumption-to-output in Bulgaria (0.15). The depreciation for tax 
purposes is  𝑑𝑑 = 0.2, which reflects the five-year depreciation plan adopted in Bulgaria.  As in 
Vasilev (2017d), the value added tax was set to 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐 = 0.2, and the tax on wage and dividend 
income is 𝑚𝑚 = 0.325 (=0.14+0.135+0.05) pre-reform, and 𝑚𝑚 = 0.281(=0.1+0.131+0.05) 
post-reform. Corporate tax equals 𝜏𝜏 = 0.325 pre-reform, and 𝜏𝜏 = 0.1 post-reform. This in turn 
produces 𝜃𝜃 = 1 pre-reform, and  𝜃𝜃 = 0.8, post-reform, clearly benefitting investment, due to 
the now preferential treatment for retained earnings. Finally, as in Funke and Strulik (2006), 
we set z=0.72. 
We then perform the computational experiment, which asks how much household’s 
consumption under the old tax regime should go up in order to make it as well off as under the 
new tax regime. The quantitative analysis performed predicts a long-run consumption gain of 
8.65 % between the two steady-states. As a result of the introduction of the new tax regime, 
capital and investment are higher by 22%, and output is higher by 9.4% as well. 
One of the limitations of this analysis is that the household works all the time, and labor supply 
is held fixed at unity, as the household does not value leisure. As a robustness check, we 
therefore extend the analysis by allow for leisure in the household’s utility function, which 
means that the households will now choose their hours of work. Following Funke and Strulik 
(2006), this amends the utility function to 





−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,        (22) 
where L=1-x denotes the household’s labor supply. For typical calibration value, setting η such 
that L=0.333 as in Vasilev (2017c). As expected, endogeneizing labor supply brings additional 
gains, more specifically another 3.9% towards steady-state consumption. The higher 
consumption gain in this scenario is due to the increase in employment (which follows directly 
from the complementarity between capital and labor in the Cobb-Douglas production function), 
which generates an increase in income and consumption, which more than compensates for the 
lower utility of leisure. Note that in this scenario labor income equals wL. Households increase 
hours worked due to the increase in wages. Labor markets are competitive and in equilibrium 
the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor, which in turn is increasing in capital. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we setup a dynamic general equilibrium model with fiscal policy to study the 
welfare effect of Bulgaria’s 2007-08 corporate and personal income tax reforms. Overall, the 
model suggests that the tax reforms increase investment incentives, and thus bring positive 
effect in the long-run in the form of expanded output, and higher consumption and welfare 
under the new regime. 
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